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Abstract 
 
The Great Recession (fourth quarter of 2007 through the second quarter of 2009) has 
been characterized by high rates of foreclosures and unemployment. Using a sample of 
community reinvestment loans, we examine the impact of structural or long term 
unemployment and cyclical or short term unemployment on mortgage terminations 
(default and prepayment). We find that mortgage default and prepayment are more 
sensitive to structural unemployment than cyclical unemployment. In addition, depending 
on whether structural unemployment is high or low, borrowers and lenders react 
differently to the incentives to terminate a loan. 
 
JEL Codes: D12; G21; R22 
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I. Introduction 
The Great Recession and its slow recovery changed in the first quarter of 2009 from one 
driven by the boom and bust of the subprime market to one driven by worsening 
employment conditions. Since employment is a precondition for most households to meet 
their financial obligations, a weak labor market should increase mortgage default. Often 
used as a proxy for adverse trigger events (negative income shocks), the unemployment 
rate has indeed been found to be positively associated with mortgage delinquency 
(Campbell and Dietrich 1983), mortgage default (Capozza, Kazarian, and Thomson 1997, 
Deng, Quigley, and Van Order 2000, and Pennington-Cross and Ho 2010), and mortgage 
foreclosure (Elmer and Seelig 1999), and negatively associated with mortgage 
prepayment (Campbell and Dietrich 1983 and Deng, Quigley, and Van Order 2000).  
 
While both theory and empirical evidence suggest that unemployment will increase the 
likelihood of mortgage default, there are few studies that address the pattern of such an 
impact. Within business cycle theory, unemployment can be viewed as a combination of a 
permanent component and a cyclical component. Unemployment caused by long term 
mismatches between labor supply and demand is often referred to as permanent or 
structural unemployment while cyclical unemployment is associated with temporary 
labor market conditions. Those components may have distinct patterns of movement and 
statistical properties (Mocan 1999), and thus, their impacts on mortgage performance 
may differ as well. Depending on how long a homeowner expects to be unemployed, the 
incentives for him to avoid mortgage delinquency and default should also differ. For 
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example, expectations of a short duration of unemployment might inspire the homeowner 
to avoid foreclosure by accessing other financial assets (such as, savings or assistance 
from other family members). In contrast, if the spell of unemployment is expected to be 
very long, then these assets may be better used to cover the costs of moving to a location 
with superior labor market conditions or covering other consumer or financial needs (for 
example, food and transportation costs). In addition, the behavior of the lender/servicer 
likely will vary depending on perceptions of the length of the unemployment spell. From 
a policy and macro perspective, given the central role of unemployment and mortgage 
defaults in the sluggish recovery from the Great Recession, it makes sense to pursue a 
better understanding of the role that different types of unemployment rates play on 
mortgage default and prepayment.  
 
In this paper, we explore the relationship between mortgage performance (mortgage 
default and prepayment) and different measures of unemployment using a sample of 
Community Reinvestment loans originated between 1991 and 2007. More narrowly, we 
use the Beveridge-Nelson (BN) decomposition (Beveridge and Nelson 1981) and the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (Hodrick and Prescott 1997) as decomposition alternatives to 
separate the cyclical and permanent components of local unemployment rates. We find 
that permanent unemployment is a more important determinant of mortgage terminations 
than cyclical unemployment. Mortgages are most sensitive to changes in permanent 
unemployment defined by the HP filter. Predictions about future foreclosures that rely, 
even in part, on observed unemployment rates are likely to differ depending on the 
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magnitude of the cyclical and permanent components.  
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. The next section discusses the 
business cycle and the unemployment decomposition alternatives, followed by a 
description of the empirical strategy and the data. Finally, the empirical findings and their 
implications are presented.  
 
II. Unemployment and the Business Cycle 
A seasonally adjusted time series y can be viewed as the combination of a permanent 
component and a cyclical component as follows  
 ttt cy τ+=  (1) 
Where c is the cyclical component (this is also referred to as the transitory, temporary, or 
short term component) and τ is the structural component (this is also referred to as the 
trend, permanent, or long term component). Numerous approaches have been proposed to 
separate the cyclical component and the structural component in equation (1) (for a 
review, see Ozyildirim and Zarnowitz 2006) including the unobserved component 
approach (Harvey 1985), the BN decomposition, the HP filter, and the Band-pass filter 
(Baxter and King 1999).  
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These approaches are based on a number of assumptions about features of the permanent 
and cyclical components that can lead to different decomposition results. For example, as 
applied to unemployment, the estimated structural component using the BN 
decomposition is often much closer to observed unemployment than that estimated using 
the HP filter. This is because the BN decomposition assumes correlated structural and 
cyclical components while the HP filter imposes a smooth shape on the long term 
unemployment rate. Another example is in the difference between the BN decomposition 
and the unobserved component approach. The unobserved component approach proposed 
by Harvey imposes a zero correlation between the structural component and cyclical 
component. Morley, Nelson, and Zivot (2003) and Sinclair (2009) introduce correlation 
in the structural models. 
 
The least empirically complicated decomposition technique is the linear deterministic 
trend approach. However, this approach is not theoretically or empirically sound when 
the series is not stationary (Stock and Watson 1988). The existence of a unit root process 
indicates that a series is not stationary. Many tests have been designed to detect unit roots 
in time series including Dickey and Fuller (1981), Perron and Phillips (1988), and Perron 
(1989). We perform the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests on the unemployment rates 
between 1990 and 2009 for 540 different counties in the US. The results show that among 
the 540 counties examined, test statistics reject a unit root process at the 10 percent level 
for only 12 counties. The same tests reject a unit root process of the first difference of 
unemployment rates for 534 counties. Table 1 presents the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
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results for the US unemployment rate (seasonally adjusted) and its first difference. It 
shows the US unemployment rate is an I(1) process (unit root in the level but not in the 
first difference).1 These results, combined with the fact that the test statistic is sensitive 
to de-trending techniques, indicates that it is necessary to examine decomposition 
techniques that do not require a series to be stationary. Hence, this paper uses the BN 
decomposition and the HP filter as two alternative de-trending techniques. The BN 
decomposition requires a series to be stationary in the difference and the HP filter does 
not require the series to be stationary. 
Insert Table 1 here. 
A. BN Decomposition  
The first difference of the non-stationary series y
 
in equation (1) is w. w is stationary and 
it can be expressed as follows 
 
K+++=
−11 tttw εφεµ  (2) 
Where µ is the expectation of w and εt is the uncorrelated disturbance term. Beveridge 
and Nelson (1981) show that the structural component can be expressed as: 
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B. HP Filter 
The HP filter assumes the structural component,τt, in equation (1) is smooth over time 
and is estimated by solving the following equation.2  
 { } ( ) ( )[ ] 

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

−−−+ ∑∑ −−−
t
tttt
t
tc
t
2
211
2min ττττκ
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 (4) 
Where κ determines how smooth the time series of τt is and larger values of κ correspond 
to more smooth time series.  
 
III. Empirical Strategy and Data 
To examine the relationship between local unemployment rates and loan performance, we 
estimate a competing risk approach and follow the empirical strategy used by Deng, 
Quigley, and Van Order (2000), McCall (1996), and Pennington-Cross and Ho (2010).  
A. Survival and Hazard Specification 
Under the competing risk framework, loan default and prepayment are jointly modeled 
while addressing the data censoring issue. The estimation relies on the construction of the 
hazard and the survival functions, which are introduced as follows. 
 
Let riλ  be the hazard rate of default ( Dr = ) or prepayment ( Pr = ) for loan i . The 
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hazard is specified as:  
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
rri
r
PDi
r
i tXttXt θβλθθλ ++= *exp,,| 0  (5) 
where r0λ  is the baseline hazard, ( )tX i  is a matrix of risk determinants that may or 
may not vary over time t, rβ  are the risk determinate parameters to be estimated, and 
rθ  are the heterogeneity parameters to be estimated which are assumed to be 
independent of observed characteristics. The prepayment and default events are assumed 
to be independent and the corresponding survival function iS  is defined as:  
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The log likelihood, LL, is expressed in discrete time assuming risk determinants are 
constant within each time interval.  
( )( ) ( )( )∑∑ +=
all
PDii
uncensored
PDi
r
i tXtStXtLL θθθθλ ,,|log,,|log  (7) 
 
The baseline hazard is estimated using local regression, as motivated by Cleveland (1979) 
and others, to smooth the Kaplan-Meier hazards of prepayment and default. Let nt be the 
population at time t and nrt be the number of termination events of type r at time t. The 
Kaplan-Meier hazard for time t and termination type r is nrt/nt.  
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The smoothing parameters are set to maximize the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), 
0.32 for default and 0.27 for prepayment. Default is defined as the first month with an 
observed 90-day delinquency on a mortgage and prepayment as the month in which the 
loan is paid off prematurely. The specification of heterogeneity mass point pm for group m, 
is defined in a logistic transformation to bound the probabilities between zero and one.  
∑
=
m
q
q
m
m
m
e
ep  (8) 
where ( )+∞∞−∈ ,mq  and q1 is normalized to 0 . 
 
B. Local Unemployment Rate and Decomposition 
Local area unemployment data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics provide 
unemployment information for each county and each series is seasonally adjusted using 
the Census X11 method.  
 
The implementation of BN decomposition follows Newbold (1990). Assume that wt in 
equation (2) follows an ARMA(p, q) process and let φ1 through φp be the AR parameters. 
Let ( )jwtˆ  be the forecast of wj at time t, and w is the mean of the forecast. The cyclical 
component is defined as follows: 
9 
 
 ( )( ) ( )( )[ ]∑∑∑∑
= =
−
=
−+−





−+−=
p
j
p
ji
ti
p
i
q
j
tt wjqwwjwc
1
1
11
1ˆ1ˆ φφ  (9) 
 
We need to determine a forecasting process for each of the 540 counties covered in the 
data. Since we are trying to find patterns for over 500 series, we rely on the Bayesian 
Information Criteria (BIC) or Schwarz criteria to determine the Auto-Regressive and 
Moving Average (ARMA) process. Each series allows for up to ARMA(4,4) with the 
default being AR(1).3  The Schwarz criteria tend to select lower order ARMA processes. 
129 counties are determined to be ARMA(1,0) during the sample period. A summary of 
the ARMA process selected for each county is presented in Table 2.  
Insert Table 2 here. 
The BN decomposition may be sensitive to the potentially less precise forecasting 
mentioned above as well as the extreme value in 
1
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p
iφ  in equation (9). As a 
result, extreme values of the cyclical component are dropped from the analysis. 
Approximately 10 percent of the counties and observations have extreme values. 
Estimation results are not affected when we set the extreme cyclical component to zero, 
which indicates our results are reasonably robust. 
 
Since the analysis is done at the monthly frequency, the smoothing parameter for the HP 
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filter is set to be 129,600 following Ravn and Uhlig (2002).4 As an example, Figure 1 
illustrates the seasonally adjusted US unemployment rate and the BN and the HP 
structural components of the observed seasonally adjusted US unemployment rate.  
Insert Figure 1 here. 
Given that HP components estimated in the past are affected each time the data is 
extended, we create a separate measure based on the HP structural component ranking for 
a robustness check. Each month we rank counties according to the HP structural 
component from low rate to high. The higher the ranking (or “score”), the higher the 
relative HP structural component is. We then sum the ranking of all months within our 
sample period. Therefore, the final “score,” or HP Ranking Score (HPRS), can be 
interpreted as a measure of how consistently the HP structural component is higher than 
that in other counties. 
 
The relationship between the business cycle, local unemployment, and loan performance 
is examined in a later section in a series of experiments. Using the default and 
prepayment hazards coefficient estimates, probabilities are simulated to investigate the 
response to changes in the observed and permanent components of the local 
unemployment rate. 
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C. Community Reinvestment Loans 
The data for the analysis come from a national sample of community reinvestment loans.5 
The database contains information on approximately 46,000 loans originated to low- or 
moderate-income families that reside in low-income areas, minority areas regardless of 
family income, or any minority borrower regardless of income or location.  
 
The analysis sample includes 30-year fixed rate home purchase loans originated in 1991 
or later, excluding manufactured homes. Over 22,000 loans in 540 counties throughout 
the country have complete loan and borrower information. The hazard analysis is 
performed on a monthly basis for loan history (loan age) up to 120 months. A summary 
of the loans by year of origination is presented in Table 3. 
Insert Table 3 here.  
The Kaplan-Meier hazards and local regressions for default and prepayment (Figures 2 
and 3 respectively) show distinct patterns of mortgage termination. The conditional 
monthly default hazard rate reaches a high of approximately 0.3 percent at about three 
years after loan origination and lingers with a slow upward trend even at around ten years 
after loan origination. The prepayment hazard rate reaches a high of approximately 1.2 
percent at two and half years after loan origination and continues to be high until five 
years after loan origination. 
Insert Figure 2 here. 
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Insert Figure 3 here. 
Table 4 includes a list of the explanatory variables and their definitions. The variables are 
grouped into those only observed at origination and those observed repeatedly over the 
life of the loan. The annual income normalized by the area median income (inc_ami) is 
used to test whether the relative income of the household makes it more susceptible to 
default or prepayment. However, low income in itself should not affect the probability 
that a loan prepays or defaults because it does not directly affect the value of the option to 
terminate the loan or the extent to which it is “in the money” to do so. The financial 
incentives should be driven by interest rates and home values. However, low income 
likely functions as a proxy for unobserved education, mobility, wealth, and transaction 
costs. Therefore, we anticipate that higher income will be associated with a lower 
probability of default and a higher probability of prepayment. Monthly mortgage debt 
payments normalized by borrower monthly income (debt to income ratio or dti) is also 
included. We expect that households with larger debt burdens will be more likely to 
default and prepay because they will be more susceptible to unobserved trigger events 
that could cause a loan to terminate such as divorce, health events, or job loss. Through a 
similar logic, a higher borrower credit score at origination (fico) is expected to decrease 
the probability of default and increase the probability of prepayment. Moreover, 
borrowers who have not paid their prior debt obligations are also less likely to pay their 
current and future debt obligations. At the same time, poor credit history will also make it 
more difficult for a borrower to find alternative mortgage financing in the event of a 
move or a decline in interest rates. 
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A high loan-to-value ratio is associated with higher probabilities of default (Kau, Keenan, 
and Kim 1994). cltv is estimated using the outstanding balance on the loan and an 
estimate of current house value generated through Federal Housing Finance Agency’s 
metropolitan area house price index. A borrower’s decision to terminate a loan is also 
influenced by expectations of future house prices, interest rates, and the length or cost of 
defaulting. We include three variables that will be discussed later in greater detail: a 
forecast of the future loan-to-value ratio (cltv12), a forecast of the future net present value 
percentage gain on a refinance (refi12), and a measure of number of days from the start of 
foreclosure proceedings to the day the property is referred for sale (fdays).  
 Insert Table 4 here. 
Following Deng, Quigley, and Van Order (2000), a measure of the net present value gain 
from refinancing a fixed rate mortgage ( refi ) is constructed as follows. At time t, the gain 
from refinancing is the percentage reduction in the discounted value of all future 
mortgage payments if the borrower refinances, PVr, versus if the borrower continues to 
hold their current mortgage, PVc: 






−
=
ct
rtct
t PV
PVPV
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 (10) 
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( )∑= +=
RMT
m
m
t
jt
jt d
P
PV
0 1
 (11) 
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Where j = c, r, RMT is the remaining mortgage term in months, dt,is the discount rate 
measured by the 30-year fixed conventional mortgage rate collected from the federal 
reserve (reported by Freddie Mac), and  
( )
( ) 





−+
+
=
11
1
RMT
jt
RMT
jt
jtjt i
iQiP  (12) 
where cti  is the market 30-year fixed mortgage interest rate at mortgage origination
6
 at 
time t and rti  is the market 30-year fixed mortgage interest rate at time t. We expect 
prepayment hazards to increase with refi, as defined in equation 10 through 12.. 
 
We also include future interest and house price volatility measures, under the assumption 
that consumer expectations are rational and correctly forecast volatility. Interest rate 
volatility (varmrate) is the moving variance of future 24-month 30-year fixed-rate 
conventional mortgage rates and house price volatility (varhpi) is measured by the 
moving variance of future 24-month metropolitan area HPI. We expect that more 
volatility in interest rates will reduce refinance probabilities since borrowers may wait for 
interest rates to decline even further. Similarly, house price volatility increases the value 
of delaying default (Kau and Kim 1994 and Kau and Keenan 1995).   
County unemployment rates are included to capture labor market conditions. Consistent 
with prior work, higher county unemployment rates indicate a higher probability that 
borrowers have lost their jobs or have a lower income stream, making it more difficult to 
make mortgage payments. Unemployment may also increase the use of “distressed” 
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prepayments, but it also makes it harder to meet underwriting requirements to refinance.7 
To investigate the different roles of long run vs. short run local unemployment on 
mortgage terminations, we include different measures of cyclical and structural 
unemployment (observed, BN and HP cyclical and structural components). The average 
observed county unemployment rate is approximately 5.4 percent.8 Given the distressed 
nature of labor market it may be tempting to think that mortgage defaults may contribute 
to unemployment. Our empirical tests uses individual loan data. The employment status 
of an individual should have an undetectable impact on unemployment rates; therefore, 
unemployment rates can be treated as exogenous to mortgage status. 
 
Finally, we control for the impact of local foreclosure laws by including the average 
number of days from the start of foreclosure proceedings to the day when the property is 
referred for sale (fdays) in each state. Cutts and Merrill (2008) estimate this number using 
Freddie Mac data. It can serve as a proxy for the amount of “free rent” that a household 
can expect to gain during the foreclosure process and the cost of foreclosure that the 
lender/investor will bear in the event of a default. Due to the interaction of the lender and 
borrower the direction of the impact is an open empirical question.  
 
Table 4 provides summary statistics for variables included in the analysis. Compared with 
subprime loans reported by Pennington-Cross and Ho (2010), on average, our loans are 
observed for much longer, have higher credit scores at origination, and have relatively 
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higher loan balances.  
 
IV. Estimation Results 
A. Baseline Results 
The results of the competing risk with heterogeneity analyses are presented in Tables 5 
(default) and 6 (prepayment). Most of the estimates have signs consistent with 
expectations and are statistically significant.  
 
Borrower income relative to the metropolitan area median, credit score at origination, 
current loan-to-value ratio, and local unemployment rate are all strong indicators of 
default and prepayment probabilities. Higher income and credit scores (the prior ability to 
pay financial obligations in a timely fashion) are negatively associated with default and 
positively associated with prepayment. Higher cltv is associated with higher default and 
lower prepayment probabilities. The variable refi is also a positive indicator for both 
default and prepayment. It is unclear why higher interest rates should drive up default 
probabilities in fixed rate loans; perhaps higher rates make competing household debt 
more costly, so that homeowners have a harder time paying the mortgage. As expected, 
we find that volatility in interest rates (varmrate) delays prepayment. However, we do not 
find that volatility in house prices (varhpi) delays default. 
 
Berkovec, Canner, Gabriel, and Hannan (1998), Calem and Wachter (1999), and Deng 
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and Gabriel (2006) find that the debt-to-income ratio (dti) has little impact on mortgage 
termination. In contrast, we find a strong link between front-end ratio and prepayment. 
However, after controlling for income, the debt-to-income ratio is generally insignificant 
in the default equations.  
 
All local unemployment rate measures (unempr) other than Cyclical HP are positively 
associated with default and negatively associated with prepayment. The HP cyclical 
component does not influence mortgage default significantly. HP and BN cyclical 
components have a relatively small impact on mortgage terminations compared to the 
structural components. These results provide evidence that long run unemployment 
measures are a more important determinant of mortgage termination than cyclical 
unemployment. We show simulated default and prepayment risks with respect to changes 
in the observed unemployment rate and structural components (Structural HP, Structural 
BN) in Figures 4 and 5.9  
 Insert Table 5 here. 
 Insert Table 6 here. 
Insert Figure 4 here. 
Insert Figure 5 here. 
Figure 4 indicates that default probabilities are sensitive to the measure of structural 
unemployment used. The BN decomposition, by design, generates a structural component 
that is very close to the observed local unemployment rate. As a result the impact of the 
BN structural component on default and prepayment probabilities deviates very little 
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from the impact of observed unemployment rates. In contrast, relative to observed rates, 
both default and prepayment are more sensitive to HP structural unemployment.  
 
B. Loan Termination Behavior and the Economic Environment 
To better understand the link between mortgage terminations and the permanent 
component and cyclical component of unemployment rates, we interact different 
measures of local unemployment with other explanatory variables in Tables 7 and 8.   
 Insert Table 7 here. 
 Insert Table 8 here. 
Again, most of the single variable estimates have signs consistent with expectations and 
are statistically significant. For default, the interaction results are most consistent for the 
credit score (unempr_fico) and the equity position (unempr_cltv). Higher 
contemporaneous unemployment rates (whether measured by observed, cyclical 
components, or structural components) are all associated with an increase in default and 
prepayment sensitivity to credit scores at origination. This impact is illustrated in Figures 
6 through 8. We perform a number of simulations to demonstrate the impact of changes 
in the economic environment characterized by different unemployment measures. The 
hazards are simulated at the 37th month (around the first peaks of defaults) with all other 
characteristics evaluated at their means. We compare roughly one standard deviation 
above and below the mean of local unemployment and set the two comparison points at 4 
percent and 8 percent for the observed and structural component and at -1 and 1 percent 
unemployment rate for the cyclical component. Figure 6 indicates that higher 
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unemployment, measured by the observed unemployment rate, is associated with a higher 
probability of default. Default is also more sensitive to the borrower’s credit score when 
the observed unemployment rate is high. In contrast, Figure 7 indicates that the effect of 
the cyclical component is very similar to the impact of the observed unemployment rate. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the observed interactions between the labor market and 
credit quality on the mortgage market are caused by structural unemployment, not 
cyclical unemployment.  
Insert Figure 6 here. 
Insert Figure 7 here. 
Insert Figure 8 here. 
Figures 9 through 12 conduct similar exercises and illustrate the interaction between 
various measures of unemployment and the equity position of the borrower (current 
LTV). Figure 9 illustrates that high observed unemployment rates are associated with a 
higher probability of default regardless of the equity position. In addition, high observed 
unemployment rates increased the sensitivity of default to the equity position. Once 
again, the impact of the cyclical unemployment components (Cyclical HP and Cyclical 
BN) on default is smaller than the structural components (Structural HP) or the observed 
rate.10  
Insert Figure 9 here. 
Insert Figure 10 here. 
Insert Figure 11 here. 
Insert Figure 12 here. 
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In summary, borrowers use the default option more aggressively when long term 
unemployment is high. In addition, mortgages to borrowers with low credit scores are 
less able to survive periods with higher levels of structural, or long run, unemployment 
but are not differentially impacted by cyclical, or short run, unemployment. 
 
Similar to the default results, in terms of prepayment, the interactions are most consistent 
for the option proxy, refi, and borrower credit scores, fico. In addition, the structural 
components tend to dominate the cyclical components of unemployment. Locations with 
high rates of structural unemployment, whether measure by HP or BN, are also more 
sensitive to borrower credit history. In general, higher credit score borrowers are more 
likely to refinance or prepay the loan. When structural unemployment is high the relative 
difference between high and low credit score prepayment propensities is increased. 
However, a higher rate of structural unemployment depresses the responsiveness of 
borrowers to interest rates. Therefore, when labor market conditions are structurally 
weak, credit history becomes even more important for maintaining access to credit 
markets and borrowers are less able to refinance existing debt when interest rates decline.  
   
C. The Role of Expectations 
Next, we examine the impact of borrower expectations on mortgage terminations. We test 
three variables: a 12-month forecast of future loan-to-value ratio (cltv12), a 12-month 
forecast of the future percentage gain on refinance (refi12), and a measure of the number 
of days between a foreclosure referral and its referrer for sale in each state (fdays). The 
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variable fdays is a proxy of the lenders costs of foreclosure and is largely determined by 
state regulations. It also proxies for how much “free rent” a delinquent borrower can gain 
while making no further mortgage payments.  
 
The variable cltv12 is defined as the ratio of the estimated outstanding loan balance to the 
expected house value 12 months from the date of each observation.11 The outstanding 
loan balance is estimated according to the fixed rate amortization schedule for each loan 
and each period assuming the borrower stays current for the next 12 months. The 
expected house value is generated based on the metropolitan area house price index. A 
forecasting rule is generated on the stationary series and then forecasts of house value 12 
months from the current period are generated for each loan and month.12 Similarly, the 
variable refi12 is generated based on a forecast of the market interest rate and remaining 
balance following the procedure described in equations (10) to (12). 
 
The estimates are presented in Tables 9 (default) and 10 (prepayment). In the default 
model, we see cltv12 is statistically significant and positive when combined with the 
cyclical (short term) unemployment rate and HPRS. Therefore, borrowers will be more 
likely to default if future house values are expected to decline. We do not get such effects 
in the long term unemployment rate (Structural HP and Structural BN) specifications. On 
the other hand, expectations of worsening equity positions (declining house prices) deter 
refinancing and prepayment even more regardless of the specification.  
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Expectations of future interest rates had no additional impact on refinancing activity or 
prepayment. This result may indicate that borrowers are willing to exercise the 
prepayment option whenever it is in the money and the costs of refinancing may have 
become so low that there is little incentive for borrowers to wait for lower interest rates in 
the future. 
 
Finally, we find that expectations about lender costs and borrower benefits, captured with 
foreclosure days (fdays), does not influence the whether loans default. These higher costs, 
however, do seem to make prepayment a more attractive option. Long foreclosure 
proceedings may give defaulting households enough time to find a buyer for the home; or 
incentivize lenders/investors to accept short sales (a sale of the property to extinguish the 
debt even if it does not cover all of the outstanding debt and accumulated fees from the 
delinquency) by increasing the cost of default. 
 Insert Table 9 here. 
 Insert Table 10 here. 
D. Serious Delinquency Vs. Short-Term Delinquency  
Finally, we conduct a preliminary investigation of short-term or 30-day delinquency 
patterns. We estimate a specification similar to the one presented in Table 9. The new 
default results are presented in Table 11. We focus our discussion on two variables: 
unempr and fdays. Both the cyclical and structural components of unemployment seem to 
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be much stronger drivers of short-term delinquency than serious delinquency (90 days or 
more delinquent). Similarly, higher expected lender costs/borrower benefits (fdays) are 
associated with a higher incidence of short-term delinquency but are not associated with 
serious delinquency. This provides suggestive evidence that borrowers are aware of how 
long a foreclosure takes. In states where the foreclosure timeline is very long, borrowers 
should be less worried about losing the home and are more willing to be temporarily 
delinquent on their mortgage. In contrast, the foreclosure timeline has no impact on 
serious delinquency. 
 Insert Table 11 here. 
V. Conclusions 
In the wake of the recent economic crisis, many government programs, such as the 
Emergency Homeowners' Loan Program run by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development) and the Hardest Hit Fund run by Department of Treasury and authorized 
under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, have been designed 
specifically to help homeowners avoid foreclosures. The local unemployment situation 
inevitably becomes an important criterion when targeting resources to deal with the crisis. 
While the observed local unemployment rate is an important determinant of mortgage 
termination, the long run or structural unemployment rate is a more important 
determinant of mortgage terminations. In contrast, short run or cyclical unemployment 
rates play a very small role. Therefore, any policy interventions will be more effective if 
they focus on locations with high structural unemployment. 
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The way unemployment is measured also matters. Default and prepayment probabilities 
are more responsive to changes in the long run (structural) local unemployment rate when 
measured with the HP filter than when measured by changes in the observed local 
unemployment rate. The probability of mortgage default is much higher for households in 
areas where long term unemployment is high. In contrast, when the BN procedure is used 
there is little differential impact. Future work needs to explore this issue further.  
 
We also find that the impacts of risk factors can vary significantly depending on the 
economic environment. For example, when structural unemployment rates are high, loans 
are more sensitive to the amount of equity in the home. In particular, homeowners default 
much more when long term or structural employment conditions are weak. This effect is 
not found for short term or cyclical employment conditions. In terms of the incentives to 
refinance, when structural employment conditions are weak households are even less 
responsive to declining interest rates.  In addition, credit scores matter even more for 
both default and prepayment when structural unemployment is high. In short, while 
access to credit markets is greatly hampered by high rates of structural unemployment, 
the impact is softened for those with better credit histories. 
 
We find expectations also affect mortgage outcomes. Expectations of higher lender 
foreclosure costs and longer free rent have no effect on serious delinquencies, but are 
associated with increased prepayments. One explanation is that the higher default costs 
may make the alternative option (prepayment) relatively less costly leading to more 
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workouts and short sales. In contrast to the serious delinquency results, loans in states 
with longer free rent time lines are more likely to have short-term (30 days) delinquency 
than loans in more lender-friendly states. These results may reflect the recognition by 
borrowers that there is plenty of time to cure a loan with a modest amount of delinquency 
in a state with a longer foreclosure time line. These results may also shed some light on 
how borrowers will react to the lengthening of the foreclosure timeline for other reasons. 
For example, some lenders have imposed foreclosure moratoria due to an inability to 
process foreclosures and legal concerns over the documentation used during the 
foreclosure process. 
 
In sum, this study provides empirical evidence of the link between long run or structural 
unemployment and mortgage termination through default and prepayment. The results 
indicate that if attempts to intervene in the labor market are to have meaningful impacts 
on mortgage markets, the intervention should be targeted at long term or structural 
components of local unemployment.  
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1
 It has been argued that the US unemployment rate is stationary (see Mocan 1999 for a 
review), especially given that it is bounded by definition. This study simply relies on the 
particular unit root test as the basis for examining different de-trending techniques rather 
than joining the discussion of whether the (US) unemployment rate is stationary. 
2
 τt and ct represent permanent and cyclical component in both BN decomposition and 
HP filter. 
3
 Applying a more elaborated routine to determine the ARMA process for each 
unemployment series may not be practical (for example, Clements, Joutz, and Stekler 
2007 discuss forecast evaluations). 
4
 The choice of smoothing parameter has little impact on empirical results. For example, 
when we set the smoothing parameter to 110,000, a roughly 10 percent change from 
129,600 (while still within reasonable set up according to Ravn and Uhlig 2002) the 
change in structural component is too small to be seen in Figure 1. The decomposition 
results are available from the authors upon request. 
5
 See Quercia, Riley, and Ru(2009) for a brief overview of the data. 
6
 This is done to control for possible endogenous mortgage interest rate on current 
mortgage. 
7
 “Distressed” prepayments are loans that are paid off early or refinanced because the 
borrower is under financial stress.  For example, these prepayments could include a 
cash-out feature that is used for consumption or to pay off other outstanding debt 
obligations. 
8
 Decomposition usually implies that the average of the structural components of 
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unemployment rates are supposed to be very close to the average of the level while the 
average of the cyclical components tends to zero. 
9
 Cyclical components of HP, BN and HPRS are not included in the figure because the 
relative change for Cyclical HP and Cyclical BN are very small. HPRS is not included 
because it is based on ranking and it is not appropriate to simulate one series without 
changing any other series. In addition, the “score” does not have continuous support. 
10
 The sensitivity measure is statistically insignificant in the level equation and we 
present it for reference purposes only. 
11
 Additional specifications used the expected change in cltv and the results are very 
similar (robust). 
12
 HPI series are either I(0) or I(1) for all cities and each forecasting rule is based on an 
ARMA process selected by information criteria. 
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Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for US Unemployment Rate and Its First 
Difference (1990-2009) 
 
Null Hypothesis: US unemployment rate has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant 
Lag Length: 3 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=14) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -0.528229  0.8820 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.457984  
 5% level  -2.873596  
 10% level  -2.573270  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
 
Null Hypothesis: First difference of US unemployment rate has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant 
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=14) 
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.989747  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.457984  
 5% level  -2.873596  
 10% level  -2.573270  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
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Table 2: ARMA Processes Selected by Schwarz Information Criteria (BIC) 
ARMA process 
Number of county 
unemployment rate series 
selected by BIC 
ARMA(1,0) 129 
ARMA(1,1) 58 
ARMA(1,2) 70 
ARMA(1,3) 11 
ARMA(1,4) 5 
ARMA(2,0) 23 
ARMA(2,1) 26 
ARMA(2,2) 37 
ARMA(2,3) 31 
ARMA(2,4) 14 
ARMA(3,0) 9 
ARMA(3,1) 4 
ARMA(3,2) 24 
ARMA(3,3) 25 
ARMA(3,4) 17 
ARMA(4,0) 0 
ARMA(4,1) 0 
ARMA(4,2) 9 
ARMA(4,3) 18 
ARMA(4,4) 31 
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Table 3: Number of Loans by Year Originated 
Year Number of loans 
1991 2 
1992 18 
1993 266 
1994 380 
1995 584 
1996 674 
1997 1,363 
1998 1,817 
1999 1,737 
2000 3,137 
2001 3,475 
2002 2,570 
2003 1,682 
2004 1,688 
2005 1,624 
2006 1,152 
2007 369 
Total 22,538 
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Table 4: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
  Variable Subcategory Mean Std dev Note 
O
r
i
g
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
l
y
 
inc_ami   0.589 0.158 Annual income divided by area medium income at loan origination. 
dti   0.275 0.074 The fraction of combined income that goes toward mortgage payments or 
front-end ratio. 
fico   678 64 Borrower's credit score at loan origination 
 
 Loans   22,538 
 
           
V
a
r
i
e
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
i
m
e
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
l
o
a
n
 
default   0.003 0.001 The first 90-day delinquency on a mortgage. 
prepayment   0.010 0.003 A mortgage is paid off prematurely. 
cltv   0.788 0.150 Current loan amount divided by estimated house value. 
cltv12   0.760 0.140 One year forecast of cltv. 
refi   0.055 0.078 Percentage reduction in present value of future payments if refinance into 
the market rate as a fraction. 
refi12   0.062 0.073 One year forecast of refi 
unempr Observed 5.430 1.814 Observed county unemployment rate (percent). 
  Cyclical HP 0.001 0.994 Cyclical component of "Observed" measured by HP filter. 
  Cyclical BN 0.006 0.864 Cyclical component of "Observed" measured by BN decomposition. 
  Structural HP 5.429 1.530 Permanent component of "Observed" measured by HP filter. 
  Structural BN 5.436 2.186 Permanent component of "Observed" measured by BN decomposition. 
  HPRS 62147 29999 Sum of county unemployment ranking by Structural HP. 
varmrate 1.5E-05 1.1E-05 24-month forward-looking variance of national mortgage rate. 
varhpi   2.2E-05 4.1E-05 24-month forward-looking variance of quarterly percent change in the 
MSA house price index by Federal Housing Finance Agency. 
fdays   113 61 Total days since foreclosure referral to sale, Cutts and Merrill (2008) 
loan age 45 28 Months 
  Observations 968,561   
Note: * default and prepayment are the monthly hazard rates. HPRS sums unemployment rate (Structural HP) ranking of each month among all 
counties. The higher the individual ranking each month, the higher the Structural HP unemployment rate is that month. Different interest rates are 
tested for estimating refi and the results are robust to specifications. Missing values in variables lead to different sample sizes with different 
specifications. Sample size of the baseline specification is reported here and estimates for common variables are robust as shown later. 
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Table 5: Default Baseline Results  
    Cyclical Components Permanent Components 
  Observed HP BN HP BN HPRS 
  Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err 
inc_ami -0.209*** 0.023 -0.198*** 0.023 -0.205*** 0.023 -0.208*** 0.023 -0.208*** 0.024 -0.186*** 0.023 
dti 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.025 0.023 0.030 0.024 0.028 0.023 0.040* 0.022 
fico -0.784*** 0.026 -0.751*** 0.024 -0.778*** 0.025 -0.823*** 0.023 -0.789*** 0.025 -0.735*** 0.024 
cltv 0.561*** 0.024 0.551*** 0.020 0.505*** 0.023 0.561*** 0.023 0.497*** 0.023 0.539*** 0.021 
unempr 0.238*** 0.019 0.024 0.021 0.048** 0.019 0.331*** 0.020 0.205*** 0.018 0.144*** 0.021 
varmrate 0.017 0.020 -0.049** 0.022 -0.080*** 0.020 -0.048** 0.019 -0.027 0.020 -0.060*** 0.019 
varhpi 0.054*** 0.019 0.104*** 0.016 0.110*** 0.017 0.010 0.020 0.075*** 0.018 0.082*** 0.017 
loc1 -0.938*** 0.096 -1.226*** 0.293 -0.094 0.093 -1.349*** 0.101 -0.818*** 0.092 -0.528*** 0.103 
loc2 -3.366*** 0.697 0.065 0.104 -2.116*** 0.587 -5.102*** 0.895 -3.495*** 0.810 -1.766*** 0.297 
q1 0   0   0   0   0   0 
q2 -0.156 0.133 -0.169 0.158 -0.319** 0.136 -0.225** 0.105 -0.377*** 0.120 0.041 0.136 
Loans 22,538 22,538 20,322 22,538 20,322 22,538 
Obs 968,561 968,561 895,274 968,561 895,274 968,561 
Loglike -79,337 -79,462 -71,731 -79,148 -71,619 -79,459 
Note: * indicates significance at 90 percent, ** indicates significance at 95 percent, and *** indicates significance at 99 percent. loc1 and loc2 are 
shift parameters of the two heterogeneity groups. q1 and q2 are logistic transformation parameters for the heterogeneity mass points. q1 is normalized 
to zero. All unemployment variables are scaled to mean 4.5 and standard deviation 1 for identification. All other variables (other than the interaction 
terms) are scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. unempr is the observed county unemployment rate, its HP cyclical component, its BN cyclical 
component, its HP permanent component, its BN permanent component, and its HP Ranking Score. These specifications are jointly estimated with 
Table 6. 
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Table 6: Prepayment Baseline Results 
    Cyclical Components Permanent Components 
  Observed HP BN HP BN HPRS 
  Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err 
inc_ami 0.356*** 0.013 0.351*** 0.013 0.341*** 0.015 0.339*** 0.013 0.338*** 0.015 0.359*** 0.014 
dti 0.225*** 0.013 0.225*** 0.013 0.188*** 0.014 0.213*** 0.012 0.184*** 0.014 0.229*** 0.013 
fico 0.255*** 0.013 0.237*** 0.013 0.288*** 0.014 0.244*** 0.012 0.291*** 0.014 0.239*** 0.014 
cltv -0.226*** 0.014 -0.271*** 0.014 -0.184*** 0.015 -0.202*** 0.013 -0.158*** 0.015 -0.267*** 0.014 
refi 0.426*** 0.014 0.334*** 0.015 0.386*** 0.015 0.389*** 0.013 0.418*** 0.015 0.382*** 0.013 
unempr -0.149*** 0.012 0.088*** 0.012 -0.079*** 0.011 -0.278*** 0.012 -0.152*** 0.012 -0.046*** 0.013 
varmrate -0.208*** 0.012 -0.149*** 0.012 -0.144*** 0.012 -0.195*** 0.012 -0.175*** 0.012 -0.176*** 0.011 
varhpi 0.016 0.011 -0.002 0.011 -0.027** 0.012 0.059*** 0.011 -0.002 0.012 0.000 0.011 
loc1 -0.205** 0.099 0.312*** 0.086 -0.482*** 0.092 0.518*** 0.081 -0.101 0.086 -0.806*** 0.114 
loc2 1.499*** 0.079 -1.444*** 0.123 1.321*** 0.082 1.992*** 0.068 1.645*** 0.079 0.999*** 0.084 
q1 0   0   0   0   0   0 
q2 -0.156 0.133 -0.169 0.158 -0.319** 0.136 -0.225** 0.105 -0.377*** 0.120 0.041 0.136 
Loans 22,538 22,538 20,322 22,538 20,322 22,538 
Obs 968,561 968,561 895,274 968,561 895,274 968,561 
Loglike -79,337 -79,462 -71,731 -79,148 -71,619 -79,459 
Note: * indicates significance at 90 percent, ** indicates significance at 95 percent, and *** indicates significance at 99 percent. loc1 and loc2 are 
shift parameters of the two heterogeneity groups. q1 and q2 are logistic transformation parameters for the heterogeneity mass points. q1 is normalized 
to zero. All unemployment variables are scaled to mean 4.5 and standard deviation 1 for identification. All other variables (other than the interaction 
terms) are scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. unempr is the observed county unemployment rate, its HP cyclical component, its BN cyclical 
component, its HP permanent component, its BN permanent component, and its HP Ranking Score. These specifications are jointly estimated with 
Table 5. 
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Table 7: Default Sensitivity Results  
    Cyclical Components Permanent Components 
  Observed HP BN HP BN HPRS 
  Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err 
inc_ami -0.355*** 0.089 -0.266*** 0.094 -0.379*** 0.095 -0.355*** 0.097 -0.365*** 0.093 -0.144 0.112 
dti -0.096 0.090 -0.014 0.091 -0.112 0.092 -0.163 0.101 -0.112 0.093 0.124 0.111 
fico -1.066*** 0.088 -1.039*** 0.087 -0.877*** 0.084 -0.815*** 0.102 -1.023*** 0.091 -0.960*** 0.098 
cltv 0.505*** 0.085 0.832*** 0.087 0.623*** 0.079 0.357*** 0.094 0.386*** 0.095 0.276** 0.112 
unempr 0.300*** 0.023 0.076*** 0.026 0.055** 0.023 0.324*** 0.024 0.253*** 0.024 0.168*** 0.026 
varmrate -0.211** 0.084 0.402*** 0.082 0.101 0.092 -0.164** 0.081 -0.193** 0.090 -0.418*** 0.096 
varhpi 0.086 0.059 -0.015 0.049 0.036 0.066 0.062 0.083 0.105 0.070 0.391*** 0.095 
unempr_inc_ami 0.031* 0.017 0.014 0.020 0.038* 0.020 0.030 0.019 0.032* 0.019 -0.009 0.023 
unempr_dti 0.025 0.017 0.007 0.019 0.030 0.019 0.039* 0.020 0.028 0.018 -0.018 0.023 
unempr_fico 0.063*** 0.019 0.063*** 0.018 0.022 0.018 -0.001 0.021 0.048** 0.019 0.051** 0.020 
unempr_cltv 0.006 0.016 -0.059*** 0.018 -0.026 0.016 0.040** 0.018 0.022 0.020 0.061*** 0.023 
unempr_varmrate 0.049*** 0.017 -0.107*** 0.019 -0.039** 0.019 0.023 0.015 0.036* 0.019 0.074*** 0.020 
unempr_varhpi -0.007 0.009 0.021** 0.009 0.016 0.014 -0.009 0.013 -0.005 0.012 -0.064*** 0.020 
loc1 -1.208*** 0.117 -0.251** 0.127 -2.010*** 0.536 -1.333*** 0.118 -1.040*** 0.117 -1.645*** 0.211 
loc2 -2.868*** 0.458 -1.475*** 0.289 -0.120 0.113 -5.373*** 0.963 -3.988*** 1.351 -0.668*** 0.130 
q1 0   0   0   0   0   0 
q2 0.038 0.171 0.148 0.168 0.280* 0.151 -0.276*** 0.101 -0.413*** 0.155 -0.133 0.130 
Loans 22,538 22,538 20,322 22,538 20,322 22,538 
Obs 968,561 968,561 895,274 968,561 895,274 968,561 
Loglike -79,257 -79,401 -71,699 -79,071 -71,548 -79,439 
Note: * indicates significance at 90 percent, ** indicates significance at 95 percent, and *** indicates significance at 99 percent. loc1 and loc2 are 
shift parameters of the two heterogeneity groups. q1 and q2 are logistic transformation parameters for the heterogeneity mass points. q1 is normalized 
to zero. All unemployment variables are scaled to mean 4.5 and standard deviation 1 for identification. All other variables (other than the interaction 
terms) are scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. unempr is the observed county unemployment rate, its HP cyclical component, its BN cyclical 
component, its HP permanent component, its BN permanent component, and its HP Ranking Score. These specifications are jointly estimated with 
Table 8. 
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Table 8: Prepayment Sensitivity Results  
    Cyclical Components Permanent Components 
  Observed HP BN HP BN HPRS 
  Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err 
inc_ami 0.172*** 0.056 0.140*** 0.054 0.367*** 0.053 0.270*** 0.059 0.178*** 0.058 0.288*** 0.063 
dti 0.165*** 0.056 0.030 0.055 0.230*** 0.050 0.285*** 0.061 0.105* 0.058 0.063 0.062 
fico 0.017 0.052 0.013 0.050 0.277*** 0.048 0.141*** 0.055 0.098* 0.053 0.268*** 0.058 
cltv 0.117** 0.050 -0.153*** 0.048 -0.099** 0.046 0.164*** 0.053 0.093* 0.050 -0.206*** 0.060 
refi 0.543*** 0.061 0.368*** 0.060 0.343*** 0.057 0.651*** 0.063 0.446*** 0.063 0.665*** 0.060 
unempr -0.128*** 0.014 0.078*** 0.013 -0.077*** 0.013 -0.245*** 0.014 -0.139*** 0.014 -0.047*** 0.013 
varmrate -0.427*** 0.055 -0.296*** 0.049 -0.430*** 0.056 -0.388*** 0.055 -0.491*** 0.058 0.044 0.053 
varhpi 0.302*** 0.046 0.042 0.035 0.201*** 0.059 0.444*** 0.050 0.339*** 0.051 0.018 0.058 
unempr_inc_ami 0.039*** 0.012 0.043*** 0.011 -0.007 0.011 0.015 0.013 0.034*** 0.012 0.014 0.013 
unempr_dti 0.013 0.012 0.040*** 0.011 -0.010 0.011 -0.017 0.013 0.017 0.012 0.035*** 0.013 
unempr_fico 0.050*** 0.011 0.046*** 0.010 0.002 0.010 0.022* 0.012 0.042*** 0.011 -0.008 0.013 
unempr_cltv -0.072*** 0.010 -0.023** 0.010 -0.016 0.010 -0.078*** 0.011 -0.050*** 0.010 -0.011 0.012 
unempr_refi -0.028** 0.014 -0.007 0.013 0.009 0.013 -0.060*** 0.014 -0.007 0.014 -0.063*** 0.013 
unempr_varmrate 0.051*** 0.012 0.033*** 0.011 0.061*** 0.012 0.045*** 0.012 0.071*** 0.013 -0.050*** 0.012 
unempr_varhpi -0.059*** 0.010 -0.008 0.007 -0.052*** 0.014 -0.080*** 0.010 -0.071*** 0.011 -0.004 0.012 
loc1 -0.352*** 0.128 -1.324*** 0.127 1.259*** 0.091 0.433*** 0.081 -0.087 0.101 0.965*** 0.080 
loc2 1.354*** 0.092 0.371*** 0.092 -0.490*** 0.103 1.880*** 0.070 1.599*** 0.096 -0.840*** 0.112 
q1 0   0   0   0   0   0 
q2 0.038 0.171 0.148 0.168 0.280* 0.151 -0.276*** 0.101 -0.413*** 0.155 -0.133 0.130 
Loans 22,538 22,538 20,322 22,538 20,322 22,538 
Obs 968,561 968,561 895,274 968,561 895,274 968,561 
Loglike -79,257 -79,401 -71,699 -79,071 -71,548 -79,439 
Note: * indicates significance at 90 percent, ** indicates significance at 95 percent, and *** indicates significance at 99 percent. loc1 and loc2 are 
shift parameters of the two heterogeneity groups. q1 and q2 are logistic transformation parameters for the heterogeneity mass points. q1 is normalized 
to zero. All unemployment variables are scaled to mean 4.5 and standard deviation 1 for identification. All other variables (other than the interaction 
terms) are scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. unempr is the observed county unemployment rate, its HP cyclical component, its BN cyclical 
component, its HP permanent component, its BN permanent component, and its HP Ranking Score. These specifications are jointly estimated with 
Table 7. 
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Table 9: Default Results with Expectations 
    Cyclical Components Permanent Components 
  Observed HP BN HP BN HPRS 
  Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err 
inc_ami -0.201*** 0.024 -0.198*** 0.023 -0.207*** 0.024 -0.203*** 0.024 -0.209*** 0.024 -0.188*** 0.023 
dti 0.043* 0.023 0.035 0.022 0.030 0.023 0.045* 0.023 0.034 0.023 0.052** 0.022 
fico -0.802*** 0.027 -0.769*** 0.024 -0.776*** 0.026 -0.842*** 0.025 -0.795*** 0.028 -0.757*** 0.025 
cltv 0.496*** 0.033 0.441*** 0.035 0.445*** 0.035 0.514*** 0.037 0.480*** 0.034 0.435*** 0.035 
cltv12 0.014 0.034 0.092*** 0.035 0.088** 0.035 -0.005 0.038 0.030 0.034 0.086** 0.035 
unempr 0.238*** 0.020 0.019 0.022 0.038** 0.019 0.339*** 0.022 0.195*** 0.018 0.163*** 0.021 
varmrate 0.019 0.020 -0.054** 0.022 -0.067*** 0.020 -0.045** 0.019 -0.016 0.020 -0.064*** 0.019 
varhpi 0.053*** 0.018 0.098*** 0.015 0.103*** 0.016 0.005 0.019 0.074*** 0.018 0.077*** 0.016 
fdays 0.010 0.021 0.026 0.021 0.022 0.021 -0.027 0.022 0.011 0.022 0.006 0.020 
loc1 -0.819*** 0.100 0.199* 0.108 0.080 0.095 -1.260*** 0.115 -0.636*** 0.096 -0.503*** 0.105 
loc2 -2.816*** 0.406 -1.067*** 0.217 -1.387*** 0.281 -4.018*** 0.522 -2.581*** 0.435 -1.826*** 0.243 
q1 0   0   0   0   0   0 
q2 0.147 0.135 0.480*** 0.151 0.187 0.141 0.052 0.144 0.050 0.142 0.289** 0.134 
Loans 21,315 21,315 21,315 21,315 21,315 21,315 
Obs 936,828 936,828 895,274 936,828 895,274 936,828 
Loglike -74,702 -74,850 -71,380 -74,545 -71,271 -74,795 
Note: * indicates significance at 90 percent, ** indicates significance at 95 percent, and *** indicates significance at 99 percent. loc1 and loc2 are 
shift parameters of the two heterogeneity groups. q1 and q2 are logistic transformation parameters for the heterogeneity mass points. q1 is normalized 
to zero. All unemployment variables are scaled to mean 4.5 and standard deviation 1 for identification. All other variables (other than the interaction 
terms) are scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. unempr is the observed county unemployment rate, its HP cyclical component, its BN cyclical 
component, its HP permanent component, its BN permanent component, and its HP Ranking Score. These specifications are jointly estimated with 
Table 10. 
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Table 10: Prepayment Results with Expectations 
    Cyclical Components Permanent Components 
  Observed HP BN HP BN HPRS 
  Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err 
inc_ami 0.349*** 0.014 0.340*** 0.014 0.347*** 0.014 0.336*** 0.014 0.349*** 0.014 0.350*** 0.014 
dti 0.180*** 0.014 0.184*** 0.014 0.184*** 0.014 0.171*** 0.013 0.181*** 0.014 0.180*** 0.014 
fico 0.287*** 0.013 0.273*** 0.013 0.283*** 0.014 0.275*** 0.012 0.287*** 0.014 0.271*** 0.014 
cltv -0.128*** 0.035 -0.053 0.034 -0.123*** 0.036 -0.148*** 0.034 -0.160*** 0.036 -0.079** 0.035 
cltv12 -0.117*** 0.034 -0.221*** 0.032 -0.152*** 0.034 -0.081** 0.033 -0.094*** 0.035 -0.198*** 0.033 
refi 0.491*** 0.051 0.544*** 0.051 0.546*** 0.053 0.470*** 0.051 0.512*** 0.053 0.534*** 0.051 
refi12 0.044 0.051 -0.085* 0.051 -0.054 0.052 0.020 0.050 0.013 0.052 -0.040 0.051 
unempr -0.172*** 0.013 0.061*** 0.013 -0.066*** 0.011 -0.281*** 0.013 -0.153*** 0.012 -0.121*** 0.013 
varmrate -0.116*** 0.013 -0.054*** 0.013 -0.064*** 0.013 -0.099*** 0.013 -0.096*** 0.013 -0.073*** 0.013 
varhpi 0.003 0.012 -0.017 0.012 -0.031** 0.012 0.044*** 0.012 -0.010 0.012 -0.003 0.012 
fdays 0.138*** 0.014 0.118*** 0.014 0.125*** 0.014 0.154*** 0.014 0.140*** 0.014 0.142*** 0.014 
loc1 -0.343*** 0.117 -1.625*** 0.151 -0.884*** 0.118 0.333*** 0.110 -0.383*** 0.113 -0.692*** 0.126 
loc2 1.413*** 0.079 0.264*** 0.084 0.937*** 0.074 1.849*** 0.076 1.357*** 0.080 1.153*** 0.079 
q1 0   0   0   0   0   0 
q2 0.147 0.135 0.480*** 0.151 0.187 0.141 0.052 0.144 0.050 0.142 0.289** 0.134 
Loans 21,315 21,315 21,315 21,315 21,315 21,315 
Obs 936,828 936,828 895,274 936,828 895,274 936,828 
Loglike -74,702 -74,850 -71,380 -74,545 -71,271 -74,795 
Note: * indicates significance at 90 percent, ** indicates significance at 95 percent, and *** indicates significance at 99 percent. loc1 and loc2 are 
shift parameters of the two heterogeneity groups. q1 and q2 are logistic transformation parameters for the heterogeneity mass points. q1 is normalized 
to zero. All unemployment variables are scaled to mean 4.5 and standard deviation 1 for identification. All other variables (other than the interaction 
terms) are scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. unempr is the observed of county unemployment rate, its HP cyclical component, its BN 
cyclical component, its HP permanent component, its BN permanent component, and its HP Ranking Score. These specifications are jointly estimated 
with Table 9. 
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Table 11: 30-Days Delinquency Results with Expectations 
    Cyclical Components Permanent Components 
  Observed HP BN HP BN HPRS 
  Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err 
inc_ami -0.102*** 0.022 -0.178*** 0.022 -0.133*** 0.021 -0.099*** 0.025 -0.119*** 0.022 -0.166*** 0.022 
dti 0.118*** 0.022 0.055** 0.021 0.060*** 0.020 0.143*** 0.026 0.091*** 0.021 0.070*** 0.021 
fico -0.793*** 0.022 -0.842*** 0.028 -0.708*** 0.019 -0.911*** 0.025 -0.776*** 0.023 -0.807*** 0.032 
cltv 0.173*** 0.047 0.203*** 0.046 0.119** 0.048 0.055 0.049 0.175*** 0.048 0.170*** 0.045 
cltv12 -0.049 0.040 0.157*** 0.040 0.146*** 0.039 0.004 0.042 -0.018 0.042 0.206*** 0.039 
unempr 0.538*** 0.017 0.194*** 0.019 0.189*** 0.012 0.763*** 0.025 0.461*** 0.015 0.158*** 0.020 
varmrate 0.063*** 0.019 -0.041** 0.020 -0.151*** 0.018 -0.096*** 0.018 -0.009 0.019 -0.136*** 0.018 
varhpi 0.022 0.015 0.147*** 0.013 0.121*** 0.012 -0.070*** 0.019 0.066*** 0.014 0.116*** 0.014 
fdays 0.066*** 0.020 0.123*** 0.021 0.094*** 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.077*** 0.020 0.078*** 0.020 
loc1 -6.772*** 0.337 -2.357*** 0.103 -3.296*** 0.170 -4.969*** 0.109 -6.064*** 0.368 -2.265*** 0.105 
loc2 -4.187*** 0.088 -4.482*** 0.360 -2.640*** 0.073 -8.474*** 0.223 -3.847*** 0.083 -4.116*** 0.403 
q1 0   0   0   0   0   0 
q2 1.161*** 0.134 0.252 0.170 0.914*** 0.184 -0.367*** 0.119 1.250*** 0.157 0.164 0.174 
Loans 21,310 21,310 21,310 21,310 21,310 21,310 
Obs 909,035 909,035 868,413 909,035 868,413 909,035 
Loglike -77,001 -77,518 -73,907 -76,739 -73,492 -77,520 
Note: * indicates significance at 90 percent, ** indicates significance at 95 percent, and *** indicates significance at 99 percent. loc1 and loc2 are 
shift parameters of the two heterogeneity groups. q1 and q2 are logistic transformation parameters for the heterogeneity mass points. q1 is normalized 
to zero. All unemployment variables are scaled to mean 4.5 and standard deviation 1 for identification. All other variables (other than the interaction 
terms) are scaled to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. unempr is the observed of county unemployment rate, its HP cyclical component, its BN 
cyclical component, its HP permanent component, its BN permanent component, and its HP Ranking Score. These specifications are jointly estimated 
with prepayment (results not shown).
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Figure 1: Observed US Unemployment Rate and Permanent Components 
 
Note: The US unemployment rate is seasonally adjusted using Census X11. BN decomposition is based 
on ARMA(1,2) forecasting of first difference and HP filter smoothing parameter is 129,600.  
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Figure 2: Non-Parametric Default Hazards 
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Figure 3: Non-Parametric Prepayment Hazards 
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Figure 4: Default and Local Unemployment   
 
Note: Conditional monthly rate is estimated with sample mean characteristics (other than local unemployment 
rates). Each series uses individual equation parameter estimates in Table 5 and loan age is set to 37th month.  
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Figure 5: Prepayment and Local Unemployment 
 
Note: Conditional monthly rate is estimated with sample mean characteristics (other than local unemployment 
rates). Each series uses individual equation parameter estimates in Table 6 and loan age is set to 37th month.  
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Figure 6: Default, Observed Unemployment, and Credit Scores 
 
Note: Conditional monthly rate is estimated with sample mean characteristics (other than local 
unemployment rate and Fico score). Both series use “Observed” equation parameter estimates in Table 7 
and loan age is set to 37th month. The 4 and 8 percent unemployment rates are chosen because they are 
approximately one standard devaiton from the mean. 
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Figure 7: Default, Cyclical HP Unemployment, and Credit Scores 
 
Note: Conditional monthly rate is estimated with sample mean characteristics (other than local 
unemployment rate and Fico score). Both series use “Cyclical HP” equation parameter estimates in Table 7 
and loan age is set to 37th month. The -1 and 1 percent cyclical compoenent values are chosen because they 
are one standard devaiton from the mean. 
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Figure 8: Default, BN Structural Unemployment, and Credit Scores 
 
Note: Conditional monthly rate is estimated with sample mean characteristics (other than local 
unemployment rate and Fico score). Both series use “Structural BN” equation parameter estimates in Table 
7 and loan age is set to 37th month. The 4 and 8 percent unemployment rates are chosen because they are 
approximately one standard devaiton from the mean. 
 
 
  
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
1.2%
1.4%
550 590 630 670 710 750 790
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
a
l 
m
o
n
th
ly
 r
a
te
Fico
Unempr = 4 percent Unempr = 8 percent
 51 
 
Figure 9: Default, Observed Unemployment, and Current LTV 
 
Note: Conditional monthly rate is estimated with sample mean characteristics (other than local 
unemployment rate and current loan-to-value ratio). Both series use “Observed” equation parameter 
estimates in Table 7 and loan age is set to 37th month. The 4 and 8 percent unemployment rates are chosen 
because they are approximately one standard devaiton from the mean. 
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Figure 10: Default, Cyclical HP Unemployment, and Current LTV 
 
 
Note: Conditional monthly rate is estimated with sample mean characteristics (other than local 
unemployment rate and current loan-to-value ratio). Both series use “Cyclical HP” equation parameter 
estimates in Table 7 and loan age is set to 37th month. The -1 and 1 percent cyclical compoenent values are 
chosen because they are one standard devaiton from the mean. 
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Figure 11: Default, Cyclical BN Unemployment, and Current LTV 
 
 
Note: Conditional monthly rate is estimated with sample mean characteristics (other than local 
unemployment rate and current loan-to-value ratio). Both series use “Cyclical BN” equation parameter 
estimates in Table 7 and loan age is set to 37th month. The -1 and 1 percent cyclical compoenent values are 
chosen because they are one standard devaiton from the mean. 
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Figure 12: Default, HP Structural Unemployment, and Current LTV 
 
 
Note: Conditional monthly rate is estimated with sample mean characteristics (other than local 
unemployment rate and current loan-to-value ratio). Both series use “Structural HP” equation parameter 
estimates in Table 7 and loan age is set to 37th month. The 4 and 8 percent unemployment rates are chosen 
because they are approximately one standard devaiton from the mean. 
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